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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses planning for vulnerable populations, those segments of each 
community that are normally independent but that may require special assistance during a 
health emergency such as an influenza pandemic.  Analysis of plans from sixty of 
Georgia’s 159 counties provides insight into the extent to which vulnerable populations 
are defined and identified; relevant agencies are engaged in planning; and opportunities 
are identified for improvement.  Recommended strategies will enable local jurisdictions 
to more effectively plan for vulnerable populations.  Some strategies have now been 
implemented and others are in progress. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
In 1918 the influenza pandemic brought significant changes to daily life in the 
United States.  Communities attempted to cope with the burgeoning number of dead and 
the disruption of society as they dealt with the disease as it was then understood.  Now, 
the country faces the possibility of another influenza pandemic, which is anticipated to 
occur at anytime.  Seasonal influenza causes an epidemic of disease that results in 
approximately 36,000 deaths annually in the United States alone.1 In contrast, the last 
great pandemic of 1918 resulted in the death of millions of otherwise healthy, young 
adults who lost their lives to a variant strain of influenza, which later became known as 
the Spanish flu.  An estimated twenty to fifty million may have died as a result of what 
was a previously unknown virus.   
According to the official United States government (USG) pandemic influenza 
website, “A pandemic is a global disease outbreak. An influenza pandemic occurs when a 
new influenza A virus emerges, for which there is little or no immunity in the human 
population, and begins to cause serious illness, and then spreads easily person-to-person 
worldwide.”2  Since the emergence of the H5N1 virus, commonly known as “avian flu” 
or “bird flu,” health authorities worldwide have anticipated that another great pandemic 
could be imminent.  The threat posed to the United States and the world at large cannot 
be overstated. Again the USG pandemic flu website warns that “Influenza pandemics are 
remarkable events that can rapidly infect virtually all countries. Once international spread 
begins, influenza pandemics are considered unstoppable because the virus spreads very 
                                                 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Key Facts about Seasonal Influenza (Flu),” The 
Influenza, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm (accessed November 28, 2008). 
2 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “What is an Influenza Pandemic?” (March 21, 
2007) http://www.pandemicflu.gov/faq/pandemicinfluenza/2008.html (accessed November 8, 2008).  
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rapidly by coughing or sneezing. The fact that infected people can share the virus before 
symptoms appear adds to the risk of international spread via travelers.”3 
There are significant public health implications that come from seasonal 
influenza.  Every year the public is cautioned by health officials,  
Influenza (the flu) is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza 
viruses. It can cause mild to severe illness, and at times can lead to death. 
The best way to prevent the flu is by getting a flu vaccination each year. 
Every year in the United States, on average 5% to 20% of the population 
gets the flu; more than 200,000 people are hospitalized from flu 
complications, and; about 36,000 people die from flu. Some people, such 
as older people, young children, and people with certain health conditions, 
are at high risk for serious flu complications.4   
Figure 1 below compares seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza to provide 





Outbreaks follow predictable seasonal 
patterns; occurs annually, usually in winter, 
in temperate climates 
Occurs rarely (three times in 20th 
century - last in 1968) 
Usually some immunity built up from 
previous exposure 
No previous exposure; little or no pre-
existing immunity 
Healthy adults usually not at risk for serious 
complications; the very young, the elderly 
and those with certain underlying health 
conditions at increased risk for serious 
complications 
Healthy people may be at increased 
risk for serious complications 
Health systems can usually meet public and Health systems may be overwhelmed 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Why are pandemics such Dreaded Events?” 
(March 21, 2007) http://www.pandemicflu.gov/faq/pandemicinfluenza/1108.html  (accessed November 8, 
2008)  
4 Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, “Influenza: The Disease,” Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/index.htm (access November 28, 2008).  
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patient needs 
Vaccine developed based on known flu 
strains and available for annual flu season 
Vaccine probably would not be 
available in the early stages of a 
pandemic 
Adequate supplies of antivirals are usually 
available 
Effective antivirals may be in limited 
supply 
Average U.S. deaths approximately 
36,000/yr 
Number of deaths could be quite high 
(e.g., U.S. 1918 death toll 
approximately 675,000) 
Symptoms: fever, cough, runny nose, muscle 
pain. Deaths often caused by complications, 
such as pneumonia. 
Symptoms may be more severe and 
complications more frequent 
Generally causes modest impact on society 
(e.g., some school closing, encouragement of 
people who are sick to stay home) 
May cause major impact on society 
(e.g. widespread restrictions on travel, 
closings of schools and businesses, 
cancellation of large public gatherings) 
Manageable impact on domestic and world 
economy 
Potential for severe impact on 
domestic and world economy 
Figure 1. Comparison of Seasonal Versus Pandemic Influenza5 
When speaking in Georgia, at the state’s Pandemic Planning Summit in January 
of 2006,6 Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt provided comments 
regarding the challenges facing Georgia during the 1918 pandemic,  
It probably arrived during the first week of October 1918, and then spread 
like a wildfire throughout the state. In just three weeks, from October 
nineteenth to November ninth, there were more than 20,000 cases and 
more than 500 deaths.  Towns and communities were terribly affected.  
Augusta was the hardest-hit city in the state. Trained nurses were far too 
few for the many needs, and they too were struck down by the pandemic. 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “How does Seasonal Flu Differ from Pandemic 
Flu?” http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/season_or_pandemic.html (accessed November 8, 2008). 
6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary Mike Leavitt Joins Governor Sonny 
Perdue at Georgia Pandemic Planning Summit, USA,” Medical News Today, (January 16, 2006) 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/36234.php (accessed 29 November 2008). 
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As a consequence, nursing students were put in charge of shifts at a local 
hospital. Schoolteachers were enlisted to act as nurses, cooks and hospital 
clerks, at an emergency hospital constructed on a local fairground.  In 
Athens, the University of Georgia announced that it was indefinitely 
suspending classes.   
In the town of Quitman, stringent rules were established to combat 
influenza, which touched almost every facet of life: Public gatherings, 
including indoor funerals, were prohibited  
• Public spitting was outlawed  
• The serving of any beverage was prohibited in public places, 
unless it was poured into sanitary cups or served in glasses that 
were thoroughly sterilized each time they were used  
• The accumulation of dust in places of business was prohibited. 
Merchants were ordered to keep their floors damp enough to keep 
the dust down  
• All cases of influenza were ordered quarantined. In places where 
the disease had struck, a placard stating "influenza" had to be 
displayed.  
Final casualty figures in Georgia will never be known. After making their 
initial reports, state officials were simply too overwhelmed to tell the U.S. 
Public Health Service anything more.7  
The concern that avian flu virus could be an ideal candidate for a pandemic strain 
of influenza has led the world to begin preparing for a possible influenza pandemic. In 
the United States, federal, state, and local jurisdictions have been planning and preparing 
to cope with an influenza pandemic that is anticipated to be as severe as the 1918 
pandemic.  However, it is possible that the virus which causes  avian flu could evolve to 
become efficiently transmitted between humans, but that it could also be less virulent and 
cause much less morbidity and mortality than the pandemic of 1918.8 Even so, most are 
preparing for the worst because the avian flu virus has been extremely virulent thus far.  
                                                 
7 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Georgia State Summit,” History Supplement. In 
the Great Pandemic of 1918: State by State, (January 13, 2006) 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic.html#georgia (accessed November 8, 2008).  
8 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The Pandemic,” The Great Pandemic: The United 
States in 1918-1919,  http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/the_pandemic/index.htm (accessed October 15, 2008)  
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The prevailing thought is that the avian flu virus may evolve to be more easily 
transmitted between humans, and it is likely to retain the virulence it has already 
demonstrated.9   
In Georgia, the anticipated impact of a severe pandemic with characteristics 
similar to the 1918 strain of virus is staggering.  The table below reflects the potential 
morbidity and mortality, based upon the virulence of the strain that emerges.  It is 
possible that a less virulent virus causing pandemic will emerge as illustrated in middle 
the column in Figure 2 below.  Even those numbers would create a tremendous burden on 
the healthcare system and cause significant disruption to society.  A severe pandemic is 
anticipated to create unimaginable burdens for the healthcare system as well as to bring 
the normal functioning of society to a halt.      
Impact of an Influenza Pandemic in Georgia 














Figure 2. Anticipated Impact of an Influenza Pandemic in Georgia10 
                                                 
9 Azizul Haque, Didier Hober, Lloyd H. Kasper, “Confronting Potential influenza A (H5N1) Pandemic 
with Better Vaccines,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 13, no. 10 (2007) Center for Disease Control, 
http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/10/1512.htm. 
10 Susan Temporado Cookson, Avian Pandemic Influenza,   (presentation Governor’s Emergency 
Management Conference, Savannah, Georgia, May 5, 2006.)   
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B. PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
The United States government has recognized that pandemic influenza poses a 
serious threat to the country, the citizens, and the economy; and, thus, it has provided 
legislative and, subsequently, financial support and guidance to state and local 
jurisdictions to enable and ensure the appropriate planning for pandemic influenza 
occurs.11  Public health began funding pandemic influenza preparedness in 2006 as a 
component of the Center’s for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement.  The United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS), Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
continues to provide funding to hospitals through state public health preparedness offices.  
Legislation in the form of the Pandemic All Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) 
continued the funding that has aided states and locals in planning beginning in January 
2007.  In addition, the recent federal guidance to state and locals further explicates the 
roles and responsibilities that jurisdictions must embrace in preparation for pandemic 
influenza.12 
1. Organization of the Pandemic Planning Efforts in Georgia  
Georgia’s Governor Sonny Perdue, by Executive Order, has established state 
agency responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions (ESF). The Georgia Emergency 
Management Agency (GEMA) is designated as the state’s lead agency for coordinating 
the mitigation, preparation, response and recovery activities of state agencies.  Its main 
tool for accomplishing this is the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, also known as the 
GEOP.  This document further defines agency requirements within the support functions.  
The Department of Human Resources/ Division of Public Health is the lead agency for 
Emergency Support Function- 8, public health and medical services. The Emergency 
                                                 
11U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “State and Local Government Planning and 
Response Activities,” http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/states/index.html (accessed November 8, 2008).  
12U.S Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Guidance to Assist States in Improving 
State-Level Pandemic Influenza Operating Plans (March 2008), 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/news/guidance031108.pdf (accessed November 8, 2008).  
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Operations Plan also addresses additional “incident annexes,” which are hazard specific 
(such as a response during a pandemic influenza or other scenario).  These annexes 
typically include or reference numerous supporting plans and documents.13   Governor 
Perdue has also used an executive order to establish a state level command group to 
direct response to disasters.  In the Executive Order the Director of the Division of Public 
Health has been identified as a member of the designated command group. Thus decreed, 
the Georgia Division of Public Health has been the lead agency for all pandemic planning 
efforts in the state.14  
As alluded to previously, grant monies from DHHS and CDC have been allocated 
to states to facilitate pandemic influenza planning.  The state public health entities 
received these funds and facilitated their use by state and local agencies.  The funding 
was tied to specific activities for each jurisdiction, including requirements that non- 
public health and non- medical agencies participate in pandemic planning in partnership 
with public health.  
2. Public Health Preparedness in Georgia  
Public health preparedness at the state level includes, but is not limited to the 
following activities (the focus of the thesis is planning the discussion will be limited to 
activities in that arena):   
• Planning 
• Procuring anti viral stockpiles 
• Education and Training  
• Exercises 
• Technical support to health districts 
                                                 
13 Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia’s Emergency Operations Plan (January 2008) 
http://www.gema.ga.gov/ohsgemaweb.nsf/46f83d65829d0a698525711f004a23d7/30c5ce607328558f85257
20900627e3a/$FILE/GEOP%20Updated%20January%202008.pdf (accessed November 8, 2008).  
14 Sonny Perdue, “State of Georgia, Executive Order,” State of Georgia, (25 August 2004) 
http://gov.ga.gov/gov/exorders/2004/aug/08_25_04_01.pdf (accessed November 29, 2008).  
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• Technical support to medical providers- (Medical Associations, ASPR, 
etc,) 
• Risk communications  
• Funding, including grants coordination 
• Coordination among and between state agencies and organizations 
• Coordination with federal agencies 
• Coordination with multi- state, regional partners  
• Laboratory and laboratory support 15 
One of the focus areas for the Georgia Division of Public Health’s (GDPH) 
emergency coordinators has been to create overarching plans for the state articulating its 
relationship to other state agencies, its participation in resolution of regional concerns, 
and its guidance to the eighteen health districts (HD) and 159 counties of Georgia as they 
develop emergency operations plans (EOPs) and supporting incident annexes for their 
jurisdictions. One of the annexes in each plan is devoted to the expected outcomes of a 
pandemic influenza. It is meant to provide guidance to government and non-government 
response agencies as they in turn plan for pandemic influenza. 
The eighteen HDs are administrative regions created by GDPH.  Each HD has 
state and county funded positions, including a health district emergency coordinator (EC) 
who is the lead planner for public health emergency preparedness in his or her 
jurisdiction.  At the HD level, ECs work to engage all sectors of the community in 
planning and coordination initiatives in each of the counties they serve to increase their 
jurisdictions’ ability to survive and recover from public health emergencies, including 
pandemic influenza.  
Planning also occurs at the health district (HD) level and involves 
operationalizing activities such as distributing and dispensing the contents of the 
Strategic National Stockpile to the citizenry.  This discussion of their activities and 
responsibilities will be limited to planning for pandemic influenza.  Public health 
                                                 
15 Lee Smith, personal communication, October 15, 2008.  
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emergency coordinators in Georgia have been tasked with coordinating pandemic 
influenza planning efforts for their respective jurisdictions.  This includes engaging 
stakeholders from other agencies and organizations who will be included in response 
activities should pandemic occur.     
3. Additional Considerations: Planning for Specific Populations 
A segment of the population that has gained considerable attention after the 2005 
hurricane experiences of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas is that group increasingly 
known as the vulnerable population.  The fallout from Hurricane Katrina has shown that 
there is a lack of clear definition of who is likely to need additional assistance, as well as 
a lack of precise identification of where these individuals are situated in a given 
jurisdiction.  In contrast, public health and emergency management planners are typically 
very well aware of the individuals in their respective jurisdictions that are for example, 
dialysis dependant (or individuals that need special medical assistance) to evacuate in the 
event of a hurricane.  In the past, planners may have assumed that individuals that do not 
have documented special medical needs would somehow take care of themselves, and 
planners have focused their planning efforts on the general population with specific 
contingencies for the relatively few others.  
Katrina demonstrated that many of those considered individuals that could be 
called vulnerable are somewhat invisible to planners, and consideration for how to 
support them in a pandemic or in other emergency events has not been well-thought out.  
This constituency has little in the way of resources to bolster its own resiliency and 
during an event it is likely to be forgotten in the early stages of the response activities.  A 
review of the events surrounding Katrina underscore this problem and can be used as a 
basis for considering how effectively Georgia has prepared to build resiliency in its 
vulnerable populations prior to pandemic influenza  as well as during and following the 
initial wave of illness. 
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4. Guidance Documents to Enable Planning for Vulnerable Populations  
Currently, there is no official federal guidance or planning requirements for state, 
health district, or county public health planners to definitively identify vulnerable 
populations and the arrangements that must be made for them.  Several public health 
working groups at the national level have identified the need for specific planning 
guidance, and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO) has 
produced a document providing guidance for states and municipalities16 that are planning 
for vulnerable populations in their jurisdictions.  In spite of a general awareness in the 
public health community of the need to determine the best approach to define, identify, 
and engage vulnerable populations in the planning process; the degree to which detailed 
operational plans are in place for these groups varies tremendously from community to 
community, nationally,  and as well as within state and local jurisdictions.   
Public health and other planners at the federal, state and local levels have neither 
succinctly defined nor differentiated the nuances among the groups characterized as 
special needs in comparison to groups that are vulnerable for the purposes of preparing 
for public health response activities during emergencies.   An important point to consider 
is that vulnerable populations who may be able to maintain independence or autonomous 
function in the absence of crisis will likely be unable to function without assistance 
during an emergency such as an influenza pandemic. Failing to consider this during the 
planning process may debilitate effective response efforts when pandemic or other 
emergencies occur and those plans are implemented.  When assessing the needs and 
characteristics of their particular communities, planners who wish to plan effectively 
must consider the many individuals and groups that may not need special assistance now, 
but will likely require significant aid during and following an emergency, such as an 
influenza pandemic. Not factoring the needs of these vulnerable populations into the 
planning process will likely result in unnecessary morbidity and mortality in the 
vulnerable populations that are impacted by pandemic influenza.    
                                                 
16 ASTHO, “At Risk Populations and Influenza: Planning Guidance for State, Territorial, Tribal, and 
Local Health Departments” (draft for public comment April 15, 2008) 
http://www.astho.org/pubs/ARPP_Guidance_041508.pdf (accessed April 15, 2008).  
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In addition to the vulnerable populations that function somewhat independently 
during normal times, there are those populations that receive some type of assistance 
from a government agency, a non- profit organization, or a faith or community based 
organization to address specific circumstances / or needs such as supplementary income, 
supplementary nutritional programs for children or medical care. In spite of this 
assistance, these persons are mostly autonomous.  During an emergency, such as an 
influenza pandemic, these populations / persons will continue to require assistance and 
support from agencies that routinely provide services to them. Whether or not those 
agencies have made contingency plans and also the detail and sufficiency of those plans 
will be of great significance to the individuals that routinely rely upon these agencies to 
meet day to day requirements.  
5. Current Planning for Vulnerable Populations in Georgia 
Currently, Georgia’s public health preparedness planners identify the “special 
medical needs” populations according to the intentionally restrictive definition created by 
the American Red Cross (ARC) to determine shelter placement during disaster response.  
“Special needs” is defined by the ARC as having “level three” and “level four” medical 
care requirements, thereby qualifying for “special needs” shelters (for explanation  of 
levels see appendix 1).  A special needs designation of “level one” and “level two” are 
able to be housed in a general population shelter, and “level five” indicates that a person 
requires hospitalization.  Special needs populations as defined for the purposes of 
planning in Georgia are not the focus of this thesis because a significant amount of effort 
is already dedicated to defining, identifying, and planning for these individuals who often 
have more clearly defined and documented medical conditions.  Rather, the focus of this 
thesis will be on the broad category of “vulnerable” who are less easily defined and who 
are therefore inherently not included in planning efforts.   
As currently understood by the emerging planning guidance literature, the 
individuals or groups that should be considered “at risk” to be vulnerable include the  
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economically disadvantaged, those without a social network, those needing support 
because of physical, mental, or medical conditions, and those who are not literate or not 
proficient in English.17   
Some examples of persons who may be considered part of a vulnerable population 
include single persons with children, or other dependents, and who are managing to stay 
just above the poverty line and maintain their households while working multiple jobs. 
With the likelihood of suspended mass transit services, school and business closures, and 
the societal infrastructure that has enabled them to maintain self sufficiency may be 
suspended. The suspension of school lunch programs may leave children in those 
families, who depend on school lunches to help feed their children, subsisting in a state of 
hunger if provision for those meals is not otherwise accomplished.   Persons with 
unaddressed physical ailments such as hypertension created by lifestyle or environmental 
factors may become special needs due to the stress and environmental changes caused by 
a pandemic.  Non-English speakers, illegal immigrants, transient and homeless 
populations, and any others without effective social support networks or ties to agencies 
that could provide necessary services or assistance to them during events such as an 
influenza pandemic are also at risk of falling through the cracks in the planning process.  
During a pandemic these vulnerable groups will likely emerge and require a significant 
level of assistance.  
Failure to plan for vulnerable populations that may not have met the restrictive 
criteria of special needs, or those who may have otherwise been overlooked during the 
planning process will likely result in the emergence of a large group of people who will 
require assistance of a special nature that may or may not be available.  Defining and 
identifying these groups within communities, as well as engaging them and the agencies 
that may be able to assist them is essential to prevent unnecessary morbidity and 
mortality.  
Media coverage of the Hurricane Katrina aftermath highlighted the plight of the 
citizens of New Orleans who required special assistance, including food, shelter, clothing 
                                                 
17 ASTHO, “At Risk Populations and Influenza.” 
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and medication during the response to the disaster.  Many of the people who needed 
assistance had not been identified as special needs prior to the hurricanes, but became 
part of the special needs population in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  In 
retrospect, it is not difficult to guess that some of those people could have been described 
as vulnerable prior to the hurricanes.  Their plight was a result of many factors including 
the population’s pre-existing poor health status, poverty, etc. These experiences illustrate 
that while there may have been a lot done to address those people that meet the definition 
of special needs, such as those with certain medical conditions or mental and physical 
disabilities, there was still a large group of vulnerable citizens whose needs were not 
well-addressed.  This is due partially to the variability of definitions of which 
characteristics make a group vulnerable as well as the uncertainty of how to best 
approach planning for them once they have been identified.  
Looking back on Hurricane Katrina, it is becoming apparent that had there been 
adequate planning for this loosely termed group of vulnerable citizens it may have 
prevented many of them from becoming special needs as a result of the hurricane and its 
aftermath.  Hurricane Katrina underscored the gaps in planning that exist for vulnerable 
populations.  Since then, much time and effort has gone into discussing what happened, 
debating why it happened, and demanding that it never happen again.  Many jurisdictions 
are trying to get their arms around how to prevent such a disaster from occurring again in 
the future.  Assessing the plans at the local level may provide a perspective on the needs 
of ECs in terms of technical assistance to be offered by the state.   
6. Assessing the Plans 
The ECs in Georgia have been tasked with coordinating community preparedness 
efforts for an influenza pandemic, but the focus of those efforts has been more 
concentrated on education, business, public safety organizations, and maintaining the 
continuity of services in each community.  The purpose of this study is to prevent future 
failures in planning for vulnerable populations, which became so evident by the events 
following Hurricane Katrina, by assessing the extent of planning for vulnerable 
populations that has been undertaken in Georgia.  An audit of pandemic planning efforts 
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to date at the state health district and county jurisdictional levels with special focus on 
issues related vulnerable populations in the hopes of identifying weaknesses in the 
planning process that, once corrected, could prevent another failure in response to the 
needs of these populations.  The key questions to be evaluated are:  First how well do the 
plans define and identify vulnerable segments of their communities?  Secondly, how well 
does the current public health planning aid in fostering resilience in the populations that 
have been identified as vulnerable as measured by the extent to which local community 
partners and organizations, which have active stake in the community, were engaged 
during the planning process? Lastly, are there specific weaknesses that can be identified 
in the county plans for vulnerable populations across all the jurisdictions being assessed, 
or do the strengths and weaknesses related to planning for vulnerable populations vary 
substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction?  In determining the answers to the 
aforementioned questions, public health and other agencies and organizations in Georgia, 
may improve their strategies for defining, identifying, and engaging the vulnerable 
populations and their supporting agencies and, thus, improve their planning for these 
populations prior to an influenza pandemic. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The integration of planning efforts for the vulnerable populations with the wider 
efforts of planning with all sectors of the community has not been well-documented. 
There are a few articles describing the need to foster resilience in communities and 
individuals in an effort to prepare for public health emergencies such as pandemic 
influenza. Literature exploring the intersection of vulnerable populations, engaging 
partnering agencies, and planning for public health emergencies, such as pandemic 
influenza, is scarce at best.   
The review of the current literature does not reflect how comprehensively public 
health planners have defined, identified, and addressed the needs of vulnerable 
populations through engaging the organizations and entities that serve them in 
preparation for pandemic influenza or other scenarios.  Instead, there is much discussion 
that indicates an awakening to the importance of considering the potential needs of these 
people that have traditionally fallen through the gaps during planning.  Much has been 
written post-Katrina to underscore the importance of taking steps to ensure this group is 
not forgotten again.  
A. PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OF ADDITIONAL SPECIAL NEEDS 
POPULATIONS DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES  
Since the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there has been a movement within 
public health to identify vulnerable populations and their needs. There is not a lot of 
language in the existing literature that describes “protecting” vulnerable populations 
during a public health emergency. The Wingate et al article ventures closest to the topic. 
The focus of their article, “Identifying and Protecting Vulnerable Populations in Public 
Health Emergencies: Addressing Gaps in Education and Training,” is education and 
training resources that are available to help planners contend with vulnerable populations. 
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The authors noted that there is an absence of resources that realistically address policy 
and planning challenges in relation to that segment of the population.18  
B. HOW ARE VULNERABLE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION 
DEFINED, IDENTIFIED AND ENGAGED? 
Hurricane Katrina underscored the need for planning guidance for public health 
practitioners at the state and local levels.  Prior to this, few resources existed to aid public 
health officials in defining and identifying vulnerable populations in their communities, 
especially in the context of preparing for emergencies.  To that end, the CDC has 
developed a draft workbook which is focused on vulnerable populations and how to 
define, reach, and locate them during an emergency.  The workbook provides a practical 
framework for initiating the process of engaging vulnerable populations with the ultimate 
goal of being able to effectively communicate with them during an emergency.  The 
premise is that by building a relationship with individuals and groups who are vulnerable 
or that have special needs prior to an emergency, public health officials will be able to 
provide them with important information and guidance during an event like pandemic 
influenza.  By creating a working relationship, vulnerable populations will be more 
responsive to the messages and guidance offered by public health as well as more 
participatory in determining solutions for themselves.19 
Issues that are addressed in defining vulnerable populations include poverty, race, 
class, language barriers, and gender. Authors such as Schoch- Spana, et al. propose 
multiple strategies to effectively collaborate with populations that are not traditionally 
responsive to overtures by government programs or officials.  Her premise is that  
                                                 
18 Martha Wingate, Emily Perry, Paul Campbell, Prabu David, Elizabeth Weist, “Identifying and 
Protecting Vulnerable Populations in Public Health Emergencies: Addressing Gaps in Education and 
Training,” Public Health Reports 122 (May- June 2007): 422-426.   
19 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Public Health Workbook to Define, Locate, and 
Reach special, Vulnerable, and At- Risk Populations in an Emergency” (draft, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia, 
2007), www.bt.cdc.gov/workbook (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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engaging all members of the community from the early phases of planning for an 
emergency to the recovery from the emergency will be more effective than the traditional 
approach has been.20   
In addition, including those that may be defined as vulnerable in the planning may 
result in improving the perceived acceptability of the plans that are adopted.  The value of 
the community engagement approach, which is defined as a structured dialogue, joint 
problem-solving and collaborative action among authorities, citizens at large and local 
opinion leaders, is then examined as it relates specifically to pandemic influenza.  The 
authors proposed that the communities’ wealth of knowledge and experience should 
contribute to plans from the outset because governmental authorities do not have the 
resources nor imagination to address the many issues that must be considered in each 
community.21  The process described by Schoch- Spana, et al. could be an effective 
methodology to foster “civic preparedness.”  The qualities that would be instilled in a 
community as a result could result in significantly increased resilience to prepare for and 
survive an emergency such as a pandemic influenza.   
 C. WHAT PLANNING PROVISIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR GROUPS OR 
INDIVIDUALS, PRIOR TO EVENTS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
SIGNIFICANCE, TO ENSURE THEIR SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY? 
While there is a great deal of documentation regarding what went wrong and 
some hypotheses about why things happened the way they did in the aftermath of 
Katrina, there is no documentation of policies in place to prevent a similar situation in the 
future.  The discussion of creating a “resilient” community or society is occurring; 
however, there is no mention of what to do in the event that vulnerable segments of 
communities are unable or unwilling to respond in such a way that will ensure their 
survival.   
                                                 
20 Monica Schoch- Spana, Chrystal Franco, Jennifer Nuzzo, and Christiana Usenza, “Community 
Engagement: Leadership Tool for Catastrophic Health Events,” BioSecurity and BioTerrorism: BioDefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 5, no. 1 (2007) 8-25. 
21 Schoch- Spana et al., “Community Engagement,” 8-25.  
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In fact, creating “community resilience” is now an area of responsibility for 
public health according to the recently released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 21.22 Relating back to the methods suggested by Scoch- Spana, et al. engaging 
all citizens and sectors in preparing for a pandemic could be a long term solution to 
engaging vulnerable populations at a community level.  As the authors suggested, this 
would require a commitment at the national level to ensure financial and other support to 
state and local jurisdictions to carry these strategies forward.23  
D. PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL 
CITIZENS 
There are increasing federal requirements that define the evolving role of public 
health in preparing for all hazards or terrorist related events that impact health, as noted 
specifically in the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act 24 and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 21; 25 however, there is not a great deal of literature that 
specifically addresses how private citizens interact with public health and other agencies 
to improve their own level of preparedness along with that of their communities.    
A recent commentary by Middaugh cautioned that placing too much emphasis on 
the choices of individuals in adopting self-isolation practices could lead to unintended, 
negative consequences for society.  In his view, one of the most challenging aspects of 
coping with a public health emergency such as pandemic influenza is maintaining what 
he called “social cohesiveness.”  The author contended that deemphasizing how 
individuals may or may not be at the root of their own trouble may be necessary to ensure 
that citizens pull together during a crisis.26  
                                                 
22 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD 21 (October 18, 2007) 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/print/20071018-10.html (accessed November 2007). 
23 Schoch- Spana et al., “Community Engagement,” 8-25. 
24 Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, “Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act: 
Progress Report Public Law 109-417,” (Washington D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services, 
2007). 
25 Whitehouse. HSPD 21. 
26 John Middaugh, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Community Resiliency,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 299, no. 5 (February 2008): 566- 567. 
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In contrast, in a commentary responding to traveler Andrew Speaker, Sibley 
wrote that society must be able to expect its members to forgo self-indulgent activities for 
the good of the community.  He argued that people’s individual freedoms, including the 
pursuit of individual happiness, are outweighed larger societal concerns.  Sibley asserted 
that there must be an increased emphasis on personal responsibility among the 
population.27    
Kindt argues that the government’s current “We’ve got it covered” approach to 
the war in Iraq and war against terror does not empower individual citizens to take any 
ownership for preparing to deal with emergencies.  His focus is upon acts of terrorism, 
but the discussion is applicable to how public health emergencies must be dealt with as 
well.  Current messages from leadership at the national level have not done enough to 
encourage citizens to prepare at the individual household or at the community levels.  His 
recommendations included engaging individuals and communities more broadly to 
increase resilience to emergencies.28   His view complements the approach recommended 
by Schoch-Spana, et al.: that there should be a government sponsored process and 
policies that support and lead communities towards participating in planning for health 
emergencies for themselves as well as for and with their most vulnerable constituents.  
E. PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AND NON 
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Public health is often considered as the lead or coordinating agency in planning 
for response to public health emergencies such as pandemic influenza.29  Clear 
documentation of the requirements of other public safety agencies and non- governmental 
organizations (NGO) is lacking, especially with regards to those at the state and local 
level.  Many of the supportive services that vulnerable populations require are provided 
by agencies and volunteer organizations outside the direct purview of public health.  
                                                 
27 Robert Sibley, “In Search of Trust,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 177 no.11 (November 
20, 2007): 1464. 
28 Michael Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from Military 
and Civilian Experience (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2006) 1-36.  
29 Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. Pandemic and All Hazards. 
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These agencies and organizations may or may not respond to requests from the public 
health agencies to plan collaboratively for pandemic influenza.   
With no clear delineation of responsibilities for planning for the support of 
vulnerable populations, it is unclear how these services, which are currently provided by 
government agencies and NGOs to vulnerable individuals and groups, will be rendered 
without dedicated attention in continuity of operations or contingency planning for an 
influenza pandemic,.  Right now, the planning and preparation is an act of goodwill that 
these agencies are participating in planning initiatives led by public health rather than a 
stated expectation.  Without clear policies addressing collaboration and coordination 
among the many governmental agencies and NGOs, the degree of partnership that exists 
among the disciplines varies significantly within and among the jurisdictions.  In a public 
health emergency such as pandemic influenza, this disjointed approach may result in 
increased morbidity and mortality, particularly within the vulnerable communities in 
question.    
F. AFTER ACTION REPORTS AND IDENTIFIED VULNERABLE OR 
SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS ISSUES  
Special considerations, including future planning issues facing vulnerable 
populations, were documented following the fourth of the federally designed and 
conducted Homeland Security exercises involving senior officials from local, state and 
federal agencies called TOPOFF 4.30 Similar issues are found in the Windstorm Response 
after Action Report published by Grays Harbor County Public Health.31  Both noted that 
more planning and coordination for these constituencies must occur for an effective 
emergency response. The TOPOFF 4 exercise After Action Report indicated that because 
of the scenario imposed by exercise, a tremendous amount of confusion ensued that 
                                                 
30 New Jersey Institute Technology, “TOPOFF 4 Looking Glass Exercise after Action Report,” New 
Jersey Business Force (November 21, 2007) http://www.njbusinessforce.org/NJBFreports.htm. 
31 Grays Harbor Public Health and Social Services Department and Environmental Health Division, 





resulted in many vulnerable and special medical needs populations being left without the 
services they required.  This finding could be foreshadowing of issues facing vulnerable 
populations during a large scale emergency in the absence of effective planning.  
According to documentation in the Windstorm After Action Report, produced following 
a real world event rather than an exercise, it appears that Public Health did a good job in 
determining who vulnerable populations were post event but it occurred spontaneously 
without significant pre-planning.  More time and energy needs to be invested in the 
preparation for emergency events as well as devising strategies to reach out to various 
constituencies following an emergency event.  In this instance there were no negative 
outcomes but there was and is definitely room for improvement.   
1. Emerging Guidance 
The recently released Planning Guidance for State, Territorial, Tribal and Local 
Health Departments 32 provides a comprehensive framework of planning considerations 
with criteria for defining and identifying vulnerable populations. It offers strategies and 
templates of successful programs and projects that have been implemented locally to 
reach specific segments of vulnerable populations. It includes strategies to effectively 
communicate and educate these populations as a key element to their survival in and 
following influenza pandemic.  There is also discussion of the essential medical and non-
medical services for which public health is responsible.  These services may be compared 
to the essential services identified by planners in Georgia.  A key assumption of this 
guidance is that public health preparedness planners have their hands on these activities 
and that public health is a key driver behind them.  Timelines are included to help public 
health planners gauge the focus of their activities based upon which World Health 
Organization PHASE, describing the severity and intensity of the avian influenza or 
pandemic outbreak is occurring.   
There is also guidance addressing exercising within the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) model to continually adapt and improve the 
plan for vulnerable, as well as other, populations.  As with other literature, it is striking 
                                                 
32 ASTHO, “At Risk Populations and Influenza.” 
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how inclusive the vulnerable and “at risk for becoming vulnerable” are.  In essence, there 
is not any segment of society that is immune from vulnerability during pandemic.  The 
challenge for state and local jurisdictions will be to prioritize which vulnerable 
populations must be addressed specifically in the plans and which “at risk to be 
vulnerable populations” should be targeted with general education or social marketing 
messages about how to prepare for an influenza pandemic.  
It is timely that the planning guidance and awareness of special considerations 
that should be made for vulnerable populations are now being raised to the forefront for 
public health planners.  Many of these themes were not well-articulated when the public 
health emergency coordinators in Georgia developed their health district and county 
plans for pandemic influenza.  With the recent literature on the needs of vulnerable 
populations in mind, an assessment of what gaps that may exist in Georgia’s plans could 
assist in health district emergency coordinators and planners at the state in identifying 
how to better prepare vulnerable populations for pandemic influenza or other public 
health emergencies.    
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. BACKGROUND  
There are 159 counties in Georgia.  Each of the eighteen health districts provides 
support to the counties in their jurisdictions.  Money was allotted through the Pandemic 
All Hazards Preparedness Act to allow state and local jurisdictions to develop plans at the 
county level in order to prepare for and survive an influenza pandemic.  In Georgia, 
health district emergency coordinators worked with county emergency management 
agencies and others to create multi- disciplinary preparation and response strategies.  
B. STUDY DESIGN 
This research will assess the extent to which the plans have defined, identified, 
and engaged agencies and organizations that serve vulnerable segments of their 
communities.  A survey of vulnerable populations planning as reflected in county 
pandemic influenza plans will be administered to a simple random sample of Georgia 159 
counties by using an electronic interface called State’s Electronic Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System (SendSS).  
An electronic questionnaire was developed in a module of the State’s Electronic 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (SendSS).  Questionnaires or “surveys” as they 
are called in the SendSS, interface can be designed by individual users to collect 
information related to cases in an outbreak; for example, or in this instance, to collect and 
analyze data about county pandemic influenza plans. An analysis tool to assist 
epidemiologists in Georgia to calculate frequency is a part of the module used to 
construct the questionnaire.  A survey was created that would determine if county 
pandemic plans being reviewed did or did not include language regarding defining and 
identifying vulnerable populations and other information that would indicate that 
provisions for vulnerable populations had been made at the counties that were included in 
the random sample.   
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1. Sample Size 
It was determined for a representative sample resulting 95 percent confidence 
intervals with a margin of error not greater than plus or minus 10 percent, 60 counties 
should be randomly selected to obtain representative results that were generalizable to all 
Georgia counties.  A list of 60 counties was generated by SAS Survey select procedure, 
and of those selected, 41 (68 percent) had submitted a plan to the Division of Public 
Health.  Nineteen (32 percent) did not submit a plan.  For the purposes of this study, these 
nineteen counties will be treated as not having a plan, although in reality there may be a 
plan that simply was not submitted to the EC.   
2. Survey Instrument 
The questions were designed to elicit either “yes” or “no” responses or to indicate 
by checking the box the presence or absence of specific language in the county plans.   
The survey questions and form in the SendSS interface were used to assess twenty plans 
that were readily available but not included in the list of randomly sampled counties.  
This provided an opportunity to adjust the survey questions to better capture information 
that were represented in the county plans and to simplify the classification of responses. 
The final survey contained 25 questions.  A copy of the questionnaire is included in the 
appendix.  
3. Data Collection 
Each plan was printed and read twice.  Each of the plans were reviewed for 
specific words, including terminology or phrases such as “at risk”, “vulnerable”, “special 
needs”, etc. that were the basis of the individual survey questions.  When plans did not 
reference key words, additional review of specific sections was conducted. During the 
review process, it became apparent that there were a finite number of templates that were 
used as the basis of planning for pandemic influenza by emergency coordinators.  Extra 
attention was paid to those plans with nuances indicating they had been tailored to the 
specific needs of the vulnerable populations of the jurisdiction for which the planning 
was conducted.   After the two reviews, responses to each question in the survey were 
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recorded in the SendSS web survey application.  Finally, the questionnaire responses 
were double checked by the author to ensure that each question had been answered for 
each plan.     
4. Data Analysis 
The data collected from the plans were cleaned and analyzed using the My 
Surveys frequency analysis capability created in SendSS.  Data frequencies were 
calculated based upon the presence or absence of each variable, such as terminology 
including at risk, vulnerable, special needs, etc. that were being assessed in the survey.  
The frequencies and percentages for each survey question were then exported to Excel 
for additional manipulation in order to create bar graphs to aid in discerning what 
generalizations could be made regarding the attributes of the county pandemic influenza 
plans.   
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The questions in the Pandemic Influenza Plan Audit Survey (“survey 
question[s]”) were designed to collect information that could help answer the research 
questions raised in Chapter I. A copy of the survey is available in Appendix 3. The 
survey questions that were numbered one through four elicited responses to indicate 
which county and health district jurisdiction was being reviewed.  Survey question five 
ascertained whether the county selected submitted a plan or not.  Of the sixty counties 
randomly selected for assessment, 68 percent provided a plan for review  
1. Survey Questions Six, Eight, and Nine 
a. Results Questions Six, Eight, and Nine 
Survey questions six, eight, and nine were meant to get to the heart of the 
first research question: How well do the plans prepared by the public health emergency 
coordinators define and identify “vulnerable” segments of their communities?  Survey 
question six was, “Does the plan addresses communication strategies for the following 
populations?”   
Survey question six was designed to determine how aware emergency 
coordinators are of the vulnerable populations in their jurisdictions and whether or not 
they had described plans to communicate either health education messages specifically 
for the vulnerable populations or if they had described risk communication strategies to 
address specific constituencies.  The data summary below (Table 1) demonstrates that 
there is a general awareness among planners that there are people in the jurisdiction in 
question that require additional planning, whether health education, risk communication, 
or other activities.  The terms used to describe vulnerable populations are used somewhat 
interchangeably in the jurisdictions with language regarding these populations. 
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Does the plan addresses communication strategies for the following populations? 
 
Populations 
# Plans that referenced the 
population 
% Plans that referenced 
the population 
Vulnerable Population 23 38.30%
Special or Special Needs 7 11.70%
Underserved 24 40%
Hard to Reach 2 3.30%
At Risk 1 1.70%
At least one of the Above 29 48.30%
Table 1.   Strategies and Populations 
Survey question eight was, “This plan defines the following populations” 
and was designed to determine whether public health emergency coordinators clearly 
defined or spelled out who or what was meant by a “vulnerable,” “special or special 
needs,” “underserved,”  “hard to reach,” or “at risk” populations.  The presence or 
absence of definitions was intended to elucidate whether planners had very specific 
populations and their specific needs in mind when writing their plans.  There were no 
plans that clearly defined who were being included or excluded by the listed terms.   
Survey question nine was, “This plan identifies the following 
populations.”  It was meant to determine if planners were aware of the population 
demographics of their jurisdictions.  For example, was there any documentation of where, 
geographically, specific segments of the population might be who are considered 
vulnerable, special or special needs, underserved, hard to reach, or at risk are located?  
There were no plans that described jurisdiction specific requirements or considerations of 
these populations.    
Survey question seven, “Plan mentions needs assessment,” was included 
to determine whether planners intended to find out during or following pandemic 
influenza how the community at large was affected and what immediate health and 
medical needs of the population might be.  A needs assessment could be conducted prior 
to an event to gain a better understanding of the jurisdiction in question and to enable 
planning.  As it related to question nine, a needs assessment could be used to identify 
geographic areas where the population may be vulnerable; for example, because they are 
living in poverty.  In addition, facilities that serve specific populations could be 
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documented for pre-event planning purposes.  Post event, a needs assessment is meant to 
respond to issues that have arisen as a result of an event.  31.7 percent of plans included 
language that a needs assessment would be conducted following the initial wave of 
pandemic influenza.     
b. Interpretation Survey Questions Six, Eight, and Nine 
The results of questions six through nine provided evidence that while 
there is awareness that there are subsets of the population that may require additional 
assistance either in health education or risk communication, they are not well understood.  
The county plans, for the most part, were composed in 2006 and 2007; the increasing 
emphasis and awareness of “vulnerable” populations began to gain momentum in 2007 
and 2008.  There was no guidance or mandate to articulate plans for these groups until 
2008; therefore, it is not surprising that, though mentioned, vulnerable populations and 
their needs are not addressed in a comprehensive manner.  With the emergence of 
guidance and an increasing expectation that vulnerable populations must be contended 
with in planning for and responding to emergency events, these results underscore the 
need to define and identify in a much more specific manner who these individuals and 
groups are during the planning process. 
c. Implications Survey Questions Six, Eight, and Nine 
Guidance with respect to planning for vulnerable populations that has been 
provided by federal and state public health agencies to local public health planners has 
been minimal at best.  Without the provision of specific definitions of vulnerable 
populations, there is a significant chance that many individuals and groups that will need 
assistance during and following an emergency such as an influenza pandemic will go 
without.  
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2. Survey Questions Ten to Fifteen 
a. Results Survey Questions Ten to Fifteen  
Survey questions ten to fifteen were designed to address the second 
research question, How well does current public health planning aid in fostering 
resilience in populations that have been identified as vulnerable as measured by the 
extent to which local community partners and organizations that have active stake in the 
community were engaged during the planning process? (See Tables 2-4 below) Question 
ten, “the plan identified agency responsibilities for supporting the following populations: 
vulnerable, special or special needs, underserved, hard to reach, at risk.” Question eleven, 
“Participation by governmental agencies supporting mental health services is specifically 
documented in the plan?” Question twelve, was “Participation by governmental agencies 
supporting aging services is specifically documented in the plan?” Question thirteen was 
“Participation by governmental agencies supporting family and children’s services is 
specifically documented in the plan?” Question fourteen, “This plan mentions the 
following partner agencies: business sector, school sector, community based organization 
(CBO) sector, non-governmental organization (NGO) sector, faith based organization 
(FBO) sector.” Finally question fifteen, “This plan mentions points of contact for the 
following: business sector, school sector, CBO sector, NGO sector, FBO sector.” The 
questions were intended to include governmental and community agencies that are 
responsible for interacting with “vulnerable” constituencies.  Their presence or absence in 
the planning process, as documented, may reveal the extent to which issues related to 
vulnerable populations have been well-thought out and addressed.   
Survey question ten was designed to determine if specific agencies that are 
responsible for supporting vulnerable, special or special needs, underserved, hard to 
reach, or at risk populations were documented in the county pandemic influenza plan.  
Only 3.3 percent of plans indicated that a specific agency was responsible to a specific 
population.   
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The Georgia Division of Public Health is a partner division of the 
Divisions of Mental Health, Aging and the Division of Family and Children’s Services in 
the Department of Human Resources.  Each of the divisions has a presence at the health 
district and county level.  Questions eleven, twelve, and thirteen were designed to 
determine the extent to which public health agency included its sister agencies to learn 
how the sister agencies are able to support vulnerable populations during and following 
pandemic influenza. 
Participation by governmental agencies supporting mental health services is 
specifically documented in the plan? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 8 13.30% 
NO 31 51.70% 
Table 2.   Supporting Mental Health Services 
 
Participation by governmental agencies supporting aging services is specifically 
documented in the plan? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 0 0% 
NO 39 65.0% 
Table 3.   Supporting Aging Services 
Participation by governmental agencies supporting family and children's services 
is specifically documented in the plan 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 5 8.30% 
NO 34 56.70% 
Table 4.   Supporting Family and Children’s Services 
Survey question fourteen was intended to capture the extent to which 
planners had been inclusive of agencies and organizations in the community that have a 
stake in the survival of the community at large and that may also serve vulnerable 
populations (see Table 5).  63.3 percent of the county pandemic influenza plans 
mentioned some or all of the following: business sector, school sector, CBO, NGO, FBO 
as either included in the planning process or described as “will be included in the  
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planning process in the future.”  Plans that were available for review indicated that 
outside organizations and agencies were or should be engaged in the pandemic influenza 
planning process.  
This plan mentions the following partner agencies: 
 
Agency # of plans mentioning agency % of plans mentioning agency 
Business Sector 37 61.70%
School Sector 37 61.70%
CBO Sector 34 56.70%
NGO Sector 4 6.70%
FBO Sector 25 41.70%
Table 5.   Partner Agencies 
Survey question fifteen was intended to describe the extent to which 
agencies and organizations had been actively, rather than notionally, involved in 
pandemic planning. NGOs are noticeably less described in the plans (see Table 6).  Far 
fewer organizations or agencies and points of contact were documented as active 
participants in the pandemic influenza planning process.  
This plan mentions/lists points of contact for the following: 
   
Agency 
# of plans mentioning points 
of contact 
% of plans mentioning points 
of contact 
Business Sector 9 15%
School Sector 9 15%
CBO Sector 9 15%
NGO Sector 2 3.30%
FBO Sector 7 11.70%
Table 6.   Points of Contact  
b. Interpretation of Survey Questions Ten to Fifteen  
The results of survey questions ten through fifteen indicated that there is 
awareness that planning for pandemic influenza must not occur in a vacuum.  Other 
sectors, primarily schools, businesses, community and faith based organizations, are 
named as essential partners in many of the plans.  There is a noticeable absence of 
mention of the non-governmental agencies (i.e. Red Cross) in the plans as well as an 
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apparent lack of consideration in most plans of the public health’s partner agencies, 
including the Division of Family and Children’s Services, the Division of Aging, and the 
Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Addictive Diseases.   
c. Implications of Questions Ten through Fifteen  
The fact that partner agencies are mentioned, if only by category, is 
significant as it indicates an awareness that the planning for pandemic influenza as well 
as other emergencies cannot occur in isolation.  However, the lack of documentation in 
most plans of actual agencies and individuals engaged in the planning process is of 
concern for several reasons, including that to ensure continuity, names must be named so 
that if new people are engaged during or after an emergency event there will be an ability 
to pick up the plan and fulfill the intent of the plan. For the purposes of planning for 
vulnerable populations, engaging specific governmental, community based organizations, 
faith based organizations, schools and non governmental organizations this is essential 
because, in many cases, these entities provide services or interact with vulnerable 
populations and are essential in preparing vulnerable populations for pandemic influenza 
as well as responding to their needs once it has begun.   The fact that essential 
collaboration not well documented among stakeholders is suggestive that much work 
needs to be done in solidifying the plans as they relate to the general population as well 
as those that are “vulnerable.”   
3. Survey Questions Sixteen through Twenty-Five 
a. Results Survey Questions Sixteen through Twenty-Five 
The remaining survey questions, sixteen through twenty-five were 
designed to provide a context for the final research question.  Are there specific 
weaknesses that can be identified in the county plans for vulnerable populations across all 
the jurisdictions being assessed, or do the strengths and weaknesses related to planning 
for vulnerable populations vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction?   
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Survey question sixteen was designed to determine the perceptions of 
planners as far as who the vulnerable populations in their jurisdictions might include.  
While the categories of potentially “vulnerable populations” are virtually endless, the 
groups most frequently identified specifically in the plans as requiring special health 
education or risk communication efforts were the homeless, linguistically isolated, and 
childcare centers. This may reflect that the perceptions of planners may not be linked to 
data from needs assessment (survey question seven) that explicitly identifies and locates 
“vulnerable” populations in a given community (see Figure 3 below).  













































































































































Figure 3. Populations Named in County Pandemic Plans 
Survey questions seventeen through twenty-four were designed to 
determine the extent to which plans identified the roles and responsibilities of public 
health disciplines that should be represented in planning and response efforts (see Tables 
7-12 below).  In addition, they were to determine whether or not critical activities were 
documented as well as who was responsible for them was documented. 
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Are shelter support requirements clearly assigned to a lead agency? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 2 3.30%
NO 38 63.30%
Table 7.   Shelter Support Requirements 
 
Is environmental health support identified/ assigned? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 21 35%
NO 20 33.30%
Table 8.   Environmental Health Support 
Is nursing support identified/ assigned? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 26 43.30%
NO 15 25%
Table 9.   Nursing Support 
Is pharmaceutical support identified/ assigned? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 37 61.70%
NO 4 6.70%
Table 10.   Pharmaceutical Support 
Is maintaining essential services mentioned? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 38 63.30%
NO 2 3.30%
Table 11.   Maintaining Essential Services  
Is the incident management system to be used during the response clearly identified? 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
YES 36 60%
NO 5 8.30%
Table 12.   Incident Management System Identified 
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Survey question twenty-four was intended to identify the extent that 
counties had involved volunteers in their planning for pandemic influenza (see Table 13).   
The plans do not indicate that these community resources have been included in the 
process of planning for an influenza pandemic.  
This plan addresses the following: 
 
Response # of plans with response % of plans with response 
CERTS 1 1.70%
MRCs 6 10%
Table 13.   Addressing CERTs and MRCs  
b. Interpretation Survey Questions Sixteen through Twenty-five  
The results of survey questions sixteen through twenty-five indicated that 
while almost all planners documented that their agency would operate under Incident 
Command System (ICS) and be National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
compliant,  Although the general roles and responsibilities were documented in the plans, 
there was a universal absence of clear documentation regarding roles and responsibilities, 
by agency, to address the needs of vulnerable populations in their respective jurisdictions.  
The absence of a definition of vulnerable populations and identification of the specific 
individuals and groups that might require additional assistance was not addressed in any 
plan in more than general terms.  In addition, many of the plans were based upon 
circulated templates in which the names of the jurisdiction were inserted.  Similarly, the 
vulnerable populations were described and addressed in exactly the same fashion whether 
urban or rural counties.  
c. Implications Survey Questions Sixteen through Twenty-Five 
In the absence of specific guidance from federal or state public health 
entities, planning for vulnerable populations is not likely to occur in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner.  The lack of definition of “vulnerable” population, the lack of 
identification of who and where the individuals and groups are within each county 
decreases the likelihood of planning effectively for them.  The county plans reflect that at 
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the time they were written, planning across the board was very general and very high 
level.  In order to address the needs of vulnerable populations and during and following 
an event such as pandemic influenza, it is essential that agencies and organizations that 
routinely interact with them are involved in planning efforts prior to the event.  While it 
is encouraging that many plans mentioned these populations in a general way, in order to 
avoid another Hurricane Katrina like response, more must be done to ensure that 
sufficient planning occurs for vulnerable populations.   
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. THE PREPARATION FOR RESPONSE IS NOT COMPLETE 
As a result of this research, it became evident that, based upon the state and local 
plans in place, Georgia has not yet completed adequate planning for its vulnerable 
populations.  The absence of specific language addressing vulnerable populations is due, 
in part, to a lack of emphasis on planning for these groups at the time the pandemic 
influenza plans were written in 2006 and 2007.  The plan audit underscored, when the 
plans were written, that there was no common understanding among planners in Georgia 
of who vulnerable populations are, and there seems to have been only a vague awareness 
of populations that might require special health education or risk communication efforts 
during an emergency response.  The terms used by planners to describe their counties’ 
vulnerable populations were used indiscriminately and interchangeably, for example, 
special needs, at risk and, or vulnerable populations, with no differentiation between 
constituencies.  In addition, jurisdictions universally spoke of these populations in 
abstract terms only, without identifying or documenting the particular characteristics and 
needs of individuals or groups living in their communities.  Similarly, the Georgia 
Division of Public Health, at the state level, had no plan for addressing vulnerable 
populations either, nor had it considered how it could support local planners in defining 
and identifying these groups within the communities they were planning for.  
Additionally, the Division failed to consider what other recommendations should be 
made to assist local jurisdictions in planning for the vulnerable segment of their 
communities.       
B. WHY IT IS HARD TO PLAN   
It is not surprising that the state and local jurisdictions in Georgia had not planned 
adequately for vulnerable populations- this need has only risen to the forefront of 
attention because of the failure of state and local authorities to respond effectively post 
Hurricane Katrina.  While state and local officials had begun to consider what they 
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should do to avert another failure in response to the needs of the vulnerable again, federal 
authorities mandated states to document how they intended to address vulnerable 
populations in their 2008-09 pandemic plans, for the first time.  The federal authorities 
may have been more motivated to push the mandates for states to plan for vulnerable 
populations because they were also widely perceived as responding ineffectively and 
inadequately following Hurricane Katrina.33   
Historically, the problem with planning for vulnerable populations is that they are 
inherently difficult to define and characterize.  This stems from the fact that many of 
them are managing to function fairly well in society, in the absence of upheaval caused 
by emergency situations such as an influenza pandemic.  Preliminary guidance has 
emerged, but even agreeing on the definition of “vulnerable population” is controversial.  
For example, this group may include those living in poverty, non- English speakers, 
children and the elderly, those with chronic diseases requiring medication, etc, but that is 
by no means an exhaustive list. There are differences in populations between jurisdictions 
that necessitate a methodology for determining who is vulnerable at the community level.   
Adopting a methodology such as a community needs assessment to characterize 
the population is of paramount importance if plans are going to address the real needs of 
the community.  Currently in Georgia, the identity and location of those persons with 
special medical needs are actively sought by planners who recognize the importance of 
ensuring that adequate provisions are made for their well being. In the same way, with 
assistance from the state local planners should be able to identify the vulnerable 
populations in their jurisdictions.     
Resources continue to be a challenge for public health and other agencies and 
organizations. Financially, times are tough and many organizations are struggling to meet 
the requirements of agency mandates.  The scarcity of resources during these difficult 
times underscores the importance of collaboration with community stakeholders such as 
schools, non governmental organizations, faith based, business and other sectors that also 
                                                 
33 Jim Lehrer, “Public Opinion After Katrina,” One Line Newshour, Public Broadcasting Service 
(September 9, 2005) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec05/opinion_9-09.html, (accessed 
November 25, 2008). 
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must consider how to plan and respond to the needs of vulnerable populations.  Many of 
Georgia’s county pandemic influenza plans reflect an understanding that multi- sector, 
multi- disciplinary partners must be engaged in the planning process, but few contain 
language that indicates the degree that agencies and organizations are engaged.  It may be 
that there is more collaboration than is evident in the plans, but in the absence of 
evidence, such as names and contact numbers of the individuals representing partner 
agencies and organizations, the importance of community stakeholder engagement must 
be re-emphasized.  
C. THINGS THAT CAN BE DONE 
To plan effectively for vulnerable populations, either federal public health 
authorities or each state individually, should consider providing a working definition of 
vulnerable populations to the emergency coordinators responsible for developing a course 
of action that accounts for the needs of those who are considered at risk for becoming one 
of the vulnerable populations in the context of pandemic influenza or other emergencies.  
In addition, federal and state public health authorities should devise strategies and 
develop guidance to assist local jurisdictions in identifying vulnerable members of their 
communities that may be considered vulnerable or are potentially vulnerable to ensure 
adequate planning is done and to guard against repeating the failures that occurred in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
D. WHAT GEORGIA IS DOING 
In direct response to this research, the Georgia Division of Public Health has 
created a working group devoted to addressing planning needs for vulnerable 
populations.  The group has convened monthly since the spring of 2008 for the purpose 
of considering what planning efforts should occur at the state level as well as consider 
how the state public health and other agencies can support local public health 
jurisdictions in planning. The “Vulnerable Populations Working Group” determined that 
a working definition of someone who may be considered vulnerable or at risk for 
becoming vulnerable includes anyone that might be functioning independently under 
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normal circumstances but who will be unlikely to do so during an influenza pandemic or 
other emergency.  For example, those living in poverty, non- English speakers, children 
and the elderly, those with chronic diseases requiring medication, etc. may be functioning 
under normal circumstances but may not have contingency plans for extreme 
circumstances.  In addition, agencies that routinely support those individuals, such as 
schools providing lunches for low-income children may not have developed contingency 
plans to provide food for those children during an emergency, such as pandemic 
influenza. In order to address the apparent need to identify, locally, those that are likely to 
fall into the vulnerable category, the working group has documented its intention to 
provide the technical support to local public health jurisdictions to successfully 
characterize, on a population level, who/what and where a given jurisdiction’s vulnerable 
population is likely to be.  
A standard operating guide or SOG (see Appendix III) was developed as the first 
product of the working group.  In it the group’s intentions to define vulnerable 
populations was articulated, as well as their intention to conduct a health district by 
health district needs assessment for each population and to assist in local planning efforts.  
Since the SOG was developed the working group shifted its focus to assessing what 
capabilities and responsibilities other agencies and organizations at the state level for 
vulnerable populations.  A survey that will help agencies and organizations identify their 
core mission and function as well as the continuity of operations plan will be devised, 
administered, and analyzed to ensure that all agencies and organizations are included in 
planning for vulnerable populations.   
Finally, in order to focus the efforts of the working group, logic modeling was 
conducted to assist in “Describ[ing] how [the group] should work, [including] the 
planned activities for the program, and… on anticipated outcomes.”34  This logic model 
will continue to be revisited periodically to ensure that it is current with the dynamics of 
                                                 
34 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Logic Model,” Center for Program Evaluation, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary/glossary_l.htm (accessed November 24, 2008). 
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changing populations.35  After the initial phase of the working group’s development of 
the public health SOG on vulnerable populations, an initiative to identify stakeholder 
agencies and organizations from state level governmental and non-governmental agencies 
will be undertaken to pull together create a core group dedicated to working on planning 
for vulnerable populations in an all hazards context.  The working group has decided that 
to avoid planning fatigue caused by exclusive emphasis on one scenario; this would 
increase the sustainability of the multi-agency and multi- disciplinary planning efforts of 
all of the participants.  The strategic planning activities of the public health working 
group will be revisited periodically, as will those of the larger multi-agency, multi-
disciplinary group.   
In addition to defining and identifying vulnerable populations early in the 
planning process, it is essential for public health emergency coordinators who are 
responsible for planning to involve agencies and organizations that also have an interest 
in serving or providing for these constituencies.  Coordinating with these agencies and 
organizations while planning for an influenza pandemic will improve the likelihood of an 
effective, multi-agency response.  Another benefit of collaborative planning may be that 
organizations and agencies external to public health will begin or continue their own 
planning for pandemic, including how they will continue to provide services to existing 
populations, keeping in mind that the possibility that the demand for their services will 
increase.      
Although the Vulnerable Populations Working Group in Georgia was initially 
comprised of subject matter experts from public health disciplines including: 
environmental epidemiology, nursing, preparedness, trauma and EMS, syndromic 
surveillance epidemiology and infection control.  Its efforts to engage partner 
organizations and agencies for pandemic influenza planning at the state level included 
representatives with response responsibilities for vulnerable populations or those working 
on vulnerable population’s projects, including the Georgia Emergency Management 
Agency (GEMA), Emory University’s Department of Health Policy and Management, 
                                                 
35 Innovation Network, “Logic Model Workbook, Appendix A, 2005,” (Washington D.C.: Innovation 
Network, 2006).  
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and the CDC.  Additional stakeholders will be included in subsequent sessions. Once 
stakeholders are identified, facilitating communication and information sharing between 
agencies and organizations that serve vulnerable populations is a primary objective of the 
group at large with the hope that planning will be more efficient and response will be 
more effective.         
E. CONCLUSIONS  
This study indicated a need for additional research in defining and identifying 
vulnerable populations as well as the development of tools and strategies for state and 
local jurisdictions to develop effective plans for these constituencies.  At this time there is 
a much heightened awareness of the need to address planning for vulnerable populations.  
The survey tool created in SendSS could provide a useful format for emergency 
coordinators to self-assess their plans as they are updated.  In addition, the survey could 
be updated to reflect planning needs from an all hazards perspective that may ensure that 
appropriate consideration is given to these populations.         
The approach that has been developed by Georgia’s Vulnerable Populations 
Working Group is an example of a starting point to addressing the needs of vulnerable 
populations.    The progress made is only the beginning.  Although there is an increasing 
awareness that planning for vulnerable populations is a priority, at this juncture the 
challenge is to engage those agencies and organizations that provide services to them on a 
regular basis.  Public health is the appropriate lead agency when considering an influenza 
pandemic, but other agencies, such as GEMA, will be the lead in other scenarios.  
Convening stakeholders responsible for planning with the notion that many planning 
considerations can be generalized may enable more effective, all hazards preparedness 
for these populations.       
Planners at the health district and county level may have an understanding that 
there are vulnerable populations in their jurisdictions, but defining who and where they 
are has not been accomplished as of yet.  Local planners may need assistance from state 
public health in community needs assessments.   States should be prepared to work with 
federal subject matter experts in creating appropriate definitions of vulnerable 
 45
populations as well as in determining effective methods for identifying them locally.  
Georgia has taken preliminary steps in planning how to support planners locally in 
identifying vulnerable populations, but has not yet made these plans operational.  
Preventing another response like that following Hurricane Katrina necessitates action; 
experience has proven that the needs of the vulnerable will not take care of themselves 
without assistance. A thoughtful, comprehensive strategy must be developed by state and 
local jurisdictions to plan for and protect their citizens.  
In planning for pandemic influenza, only a well coordinated, multi- discipline, 
multi-sector effort will ensure the well-being and survival of the community.  In planning 
for the community’s survival, there must be additional considerations given to segments 
of communities that are “vulnerable” and may identify and address those needs should be 
considered prior to the influenza pandemic.  Effectively defining, identifying, and 
engaging “vulnerable” sectors of the community is essential to planning and coordinating 
response activities to ensure the likelihood that they will survive and recover from 
emergencies such as an influenza pandemic. 
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APPENDIX I. LEVEL OF CARE DEFINITIONS 
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCESLEVELS OF CARE 














Persons who are 
independent and capable of 
self-care requiring only 
minimal support for minor 
illnesses and injuries. 
 
Well, able-bodied; sprains, strains, 
cuts, abrasions; colds; taking 
medication for stable acute or chronic 
conditions such as arthritis; pregnant 
women up to 40+ weeks who have 









Persons with conditions 
requiring observation or 
minor supportive assistance 
in activities of daily living. 
Independent with some 
family/caretaker support.  
 
Requires use of wheelchair or 
assistive device, but can transfer; 
stable diabetics (insulin or diet 
controlled); currently stable, but on 
medication for stable cardiac or 
respiratory conditions; impaired 
hearing or vision; mental health 










Persons with conditions 
requiring some level of 
privacy or separation but do 
not require skilled or 
continuous health care 
support from facility staff.   
 
Communicable diseases like chicken 
pox or roseola; persons on 
chemotherapy or radiation; people 
with drug controlled TB; those with 
moderate Alzheimer’s or dementia; 
those requiring assistance from 
family member/ caretaker in activities 
of daily living and have that person 
with them; those with portable O2 in 








or wing in 
shelter). 








Persons requiring frequent 
or continuous surveillance 
for potentially life-
threatening conditions or 
require bedding or bathroom 
facilities not available in the 
shelter. 
 
Incontinent persons or those 
requiring assistance with toileting; 
those with limited mobility who 
cannot sleep on a cot or transfer; 
brittle diabetics or epileptics; oxygen 
dependent persons; those with 
severe dementia or psychiatric 










Persons requiring skilled 
care, continuous 
observation, or special 
equipment and services 
 
Those needing IV feeding or 
medication; completely bedfast 
requiring total care, uncontrolled 















usually found in a hospital. conditions; women in active labor; 
those with significant injuries, 




can occur if 
needed 
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This Standard Operating Guide(SOG) provides guidance for planning, preparing 
and coordinating assistance of  vulnerable populations during all-hazard emergencies at 
the state and local levels.  This SOG provides a proposed plan for the Georgia Division of 
Public Health(DPH) , Public Health District Directors and local Directors of Public 
Health on identifying and engaging government and private sector entities, community 
based organizations and other support agencies in developing local and district 
emergency plans for vulnerable populations within their jurisdictions. 
This annex addresses planning for vulnerable populations. Defining and 
identifying these groups within communities, as well as engaging them, and the agencies 
that may assist them, is essential in preventing unnecessary morbidity and mortality. 
II. SITUATION 
Public health and other agencies that respond to disasters should address the needs 
of the state’s vulnerable populations in the planning process. The Georgia the Department 
of Human Resources (DHR), as the lead agency for sections 6 and 8 of the U.S. 
Government Emergency Support Functions (ESF-6 and ESF-8), addresses health and 
medical functions within the cycle of prevention, preparation, response and recovery.  
Within DHR, DPH is responsible for identifying vulnerable populations, determining 
their potential needs during a disaster, and coordinating with other agencies and 
organizations to ensure that they are cared for should an event of public health 
significance occur.   
During a disaster, everyone in the population is vulnerable.  Persons with special 
needs and special medical needs, such as dialysis patients and nursing home residents, 
require specific response planning to address their particular needs. However, there are 
others in the general population who on a day to day basis are independent of special 
care, but during a disaster are more vulnerable than the general population. During a 
disaster, these individuals or groups who are considered  include persons who are 
economically disadvantaged, those without a social network, those needing support 
because of physical, mental, or chronic medical conditions, and those who are not literate 
or not proficient in English.(1)  Understanding how different groups or segments of the 
community are “vulnerable” and identifying their needs during a disaster will require 
planning by public health and other agencies that are engaged in response activities. 
Although there is no current official federal guidance or planning requirement for 
state, health district or county public health planners that definitively identifies 
‘vulnerable’ populations.  disaster response plans should include the needs and 
characteristics of these populations. When assessing the needs and characteristics of their 
particular communities, planners must consider individuals and groups that may not need 
special assistance now, but who will be ‘vulnerable’ during and following a disaster  This 
subset of the general population will need varying levels of assistance.  The assistance 
may differ in type and amount from that which is required by the “special needs” and the 
“special medical needs populations.” Failure to plan for vulnerable populations or for 
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those who may have otherwise been overlooked during the emergency planning process, 
will likely result in the unexpected emergence of a large group of people requiring 
assistance of a special nature that may or may not be available within the planning 
jurisdictions.   
Thus, the focus of this SOG will be on this subset of the general population and 
will be heretofore be referred to as the “vulnerable population.”  This annex addresses 
planning, preparing, and coordinating for vulnerable populations for response to all 
hazards.  
 
III. ASSUMPTIONS  
 
• A significant segment of the community that does not currently meet the definition of 
“special needs” and “special medical needs” will require assistance during a disaster. 
This segment of the population may not be identified as vulnerable until a disaster 
occurs.   
• Understanding how different groups or segments of the community are “vulnerable” 
and identifying their needs during a disaster will require planning on the part of 
public health and other disaster management agencies that are engaged in response 
activities.  
• Community engagement in planning activities will serve as a pivotal focus of 
resources to reach wider audiences of “vulnerable populations.”   This empowers 
communities and individuals to create resiliency and survival strategies.   
 
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
 
The overall concept of operations is to define, identify and coordinate the assistance of 
vulnerable populations during an emergency occur in the phases according to the cycle of 
preparedness.      
 
This SOG supports the Public Health EOP’s 3 phases of emergency management: 
 
Phase I: Preparedness and Prevention 
Phase II: Detection and Response 
Phase III: Recovery and Mitigation 
 
Phase I:    Preparedness and Prevention  
 
This phase includes preparation for an event of public health significance and 
prevention of circumstances leading to emergencies. 
 
• Identify state, regional, and local agencies and organizations that currently serve 




• Convene stakeholder meetings to identify specific needs of vulnerable 
populations during emergencies and to discuss roles and responsibilities of 
responding and support agencies and organizations during these emergencies; 
periodically reconvening these meetings to maintain familiarity of the developed 
plan..  
• Create and maintain a contact list of these agencies and organizations that 
typically serve the identified populations.  
• Collect and analyze population health status data to identify and enumerate the 
various vulnerable populations within the state, health district, and county levels. 
• Characterize groups based upon their risk and degree of vulnerability by type of 
event. 
• Develop communication materials and prepare communication strategies 
targeting vulnerable populations. 
• Develop specific strategies to effectively respond in assisting vulnerable 
populations during emergencies. 
 
Phase II:    Detection and Response 
 
This phase includes the detection of and response to an event of public health 
significance depending upon the nature of the incident, the appropriate response will 
be determined and acted upon using appropriate annexes, Standard Operating 
Procedures(SOP) and Standard Operating Guides(SOG). 
 
The Division of Public Health response activities will be event specific.  
 
• Alert stakeholders to implement the developed plan and convene as soon as 
practical to discuss challenges and proposals to overcome those challenges. 
• Maintain communication with the stakeholders to prioritize assistance requested 
and determine whether the needs of each vulnerable population are being met. 
• Deploying pre-designed communication messages to vulnerable populations  
• Implement epidemiologic surveillance to detect and respond to public health 
needs of the vulnerable population. 
• If an event requires sheltering of vulnerable populations, then the Georgia 
Department of Human Resources Guidelines for the Care of Populations with 
Special Needs During Disasters and Emergencies (2006) should accompany this 
plan.   
 
Phase III:   Recovery and Mitigation  
 
Recovery is the transition to normal operations.  Short-term recovery actions are 
taken to assess damage and return vital life-support systems to minimum operating 
standards.  Long-term recovery may go on for years and involve the development, 
coordination and execution of services.  Mitigation minimizes the adverse impact of 
an emergency and reduces the vulnerability to future emergencies.  Mitigation 
measures may be implemented at any time. 
 55
• Public Health District Directors and local Directors of Public Health coordinate 
with stakeholders as vulnerable populations transition from requiring assistance to 
being self-sufficient. 
• Establish a process to ensure continuation of assistance as needed during the 
entire recovery phase. 
• Convene post-event stakeholder meeting or meetings to determine whether the 
needs of vulnerable populations have been met and revise plans and develop 





The planning activities for assisting vulnerable populations during an emergency will be 
conducted in 5 stages.  
 
Stage 1 :  Staff from DPH including representatives from Emergency Medical 
Services(EMS), Emergency Preparedness, Nursing, Epidemiology, and the 
Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Addictive Diseases 
(MHDDAD) will identify specific portions of the Georgia population who are 
likely to be “vulnerable” during an emergency and will attempt to identify their 
level of  “vulnerability.”   
 
Stage 2:  DPH and MHDDAD will identify stakeholders amongst state 
government agencies to determine and document their roles and responsibilities 
for the identified vulnerable populations; community organizations that advocate 
for their welfare; and the business community, including businesses that provide 
critical community infrastructure, such as communications and power companies, 
to help determine responses needed to assist vulnerable populations in a disaster 
setting 
 
Stage 3:  DPH will develop a general framework for assisting vulnerable 
populations, including definitions, characteristics, anticipated needs, and potential 
resources to help meet those needs. 
 
Stage 4:  Once the vulnerable groups have been identified, a framework for 
planning will be developed to assist health districts and counties in planning for 
vulnerable populations in their communities.  In addition to identifying locally-
specific characteristics, anticipated needs, and available resources, the plan will 
include procedures such as communication pathways, distribution of goods and 
services, and provisions for on-site assistance to help ensure survival and recovery 
of the vulnerable populations. 
 
Stage 5: Planning for assisting vulnerable populations and their continuity of 




VI. Roles and Responsibilities 
[To be determined during planning] 
 
VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS  
 
Initially, the local community will be responsible for assisting vulnerable populations 
during emergencies.  However, if the event overwhelms local administrative support, 
GEMA and DHR will address the requirements for support collaboratively.  Logistical 
support assisted by GEMA will be achieved under the existing emergency response 
protocols. 
 
VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
 
     DPH will review and revise this plan annually.  
 
IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES  
 
1. Association of State and Territorial Health Officers. At Risk Populations and 
Influenza: Planning Guidance for State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Health 
Departments (DRAFT), for comment April 15, 2008. 
 
This document provides a comprehensive framework of planning considerations with 
criteria for defining and identifying vulnerable populations. It offers strategies and 
templates of successful programs and projects that have been implemented locally to 
reach specific segments of vulnerable populations. The document includes strategies 
to effectively communicate and educate these populations as a key element to their 





 Attachment A : DHR Shelter Levels of Care 
 
Attachment B: Essential Services of Public Health During an Emergency 
 
Attachment C: Identifying Vulnerability and Communicating Through Other 
Organizations 
 
Attachment D: Example of Generic Information to use in response to Vulnerable 
Populations  
                          during an emergency   
 
Attachment E:  Georgia Department of Human Resources Guidelines for the Care of  
                           Populations with Special Needs During Disasters and Emergencies 
(2006) 
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